Proceedings of the 52nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2019

An Empirical Study of Home User Intentions towards Computer Security
Annette M. Mills
University of Canterbury
annette.mills@canterbury.ac.nz

Abstract
Home computer users are solely responsible for
implementing security measures on their devices.
Although most computers have security software
installed, the potential remains for security breaches,
which makes it important for home users to take
additional steps, such as not sharing one’s password
and using strong passwords, to secure their devices
further. Drawing on protection motivation theory and
findings from prior research, this study evaluates
factors that influence individuals to implement
additional security measures to protect their home
computers. Using SmartPLS and responses from 72
home computer users, the results show that response
efficacy, self-efficacy and subjective norms were
significant in encouraging persons to implement
additional security measures. Maladaptive rewards
on the other hand acted as a significant detractor,
while neither perceived vulnerability nor perceived
severity was significant in relation to willingness to
implement additional security measures.

1. Introduction
Home computers have become an ideal breeding
ground for hacking, distributing, or holding sensitive
information to ransom [1] Although home computers
are sold with a base level of security, this is not
always enough. To reduce the potential for security
breaches, it is important that people take additional
steps to secure their devices. These can include
simple steps such as using strong passwords or
backing up their data, and exercising caution when
installing new applications or programs on a home
computer or laptop. However, people often do not
follow the advice of experts and take additional to
secure their devices, resulting in a low level of
security of home computing devices [1].
Understanding the home setting is important.
Today many persons use personal devices for work
related purposes. As more companies engage with
individuals online, this results in a large amount of
sensitive information being stored on personal
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computers (including documents related to banking
and insurance), making it increasingly important to
secure these devices. Most studies of information
systems (IS) security however, have been in
organizational settings [1, 2]. This research may not
generalize readily to the home context due to
differences such as the role of training, and the
presence of sanctions and policies in organizations
that govern compliance [1]. Hence it is important to
examine the home setting, and understand how to
motivate people to take extra steps to protect their
home computers [3].
To address the research aim, this study draws
primarily on Protection Motivation Theory [4] which
has been successfully used to explain attitudes
towards IS security compliance in organizations [5],
as well as the protective security behaviors of home
computer users [6]. The PMT assumes that the
motivators behind protecting something is a result of
a person’s assessment of the perceived severity of a
threat, probability of the threat occurring, the efficacy
of the response behavior, and the confidence level in
their ability to act upon the threat [4, 7]. The PMT is
further extended by incorporating subjective norms
(from the Theory of Reasoned Action) which has
been commonly cited in the PMT literature as
significant in explaining an individual’s intention
behind taking security –related actions [9, 10, 11]
This paper reports on a study that investigates
peoples’ willingness to take additional protective
measures to secure their home computers. By
improving our understanding of people’s beliefs
about the protection of home computers, this study
aims to provide insights that can usefully inform
computer service providers and other organizations
on how to design better support services and improve
home computer security.

2. Prior Research
With the recognition that many security breaches
are directly or indirectly caused by failure to comply
with security policies, much of the early research on
motivations regarding computer security has been in
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the organizational context. With the rise in home
computer use, individuals who own personal
computers are also becoming more vulnerable to
security breaches [12]. Therefore, it is important that
they too apply security measures on their computers
to reduce the potential for security breaches to occur
[13]. This study aims to address this need.
Studies have used various theories to identify the
factors influencing computer security behaviors [2].
The PMT in particular has been used in studies of IS
security; these have found constructs that form threat
and coping appraisals have significant impacts on the
intention of individuals to take preventative computer
security measures at work [5, 9, 10], and at home [2,
6, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. There have been mixed
findings. For example, some found constructs such as
perceived vulnerability to be significant [5], while
others did not [15]. Others have focused on
incorporating factors from other theories such as
social influence from the Theory of Reasoned Action
to better explain intention [2, 6, 9 13].
In the home context, most studies using the PMT
focus on general security behaviors [2, 13, 17, 18,
20], or specific protective behaviors such as adoption
of security on home wireless networks [19] or the use
of password management systems [17]. However,
what these studies do not address are the additional
steps that people are encouraged to take to protect
their devices and their data, and stay safe when they
are online (e.g. not sharing their passwords with
others, using different passwords for different devices
and accounts, and backing up one’s data) [21]. Thus
the focus of this research is to bridge this gap by
examining peoples’ motivations to go beyond the
basics and take additional steps to protect their home
computers from threats.

3. Research Model
3.1 Protection Motivation Theory
Prior research has used many theories to examine
protective behaviors. These include the Theory of
Reasoned Action, the Theory of Planned Behavior
and the Protection Motivation Theory. Of these,
Protection Motivation Theory is particularly relevant
to this study because of its explicit consideration of a
threat and one’s ability to cope with it.
Grounded in healthcare, Protection Motivation
Theory (PMT) was developed to identify the
cognitive processes that an individual faces when
exposed to a threat [4]. According to the PMT [4, 7],
protection motivation arises from consideration of a
potential threat and one’s desire to avoid the

consequences of the threat. This involves two main
cognitive processes – a threat appraisal and a coping
appraisal. The threat appraisal identifies and
evaluates the threat in terms of the perceived severity
of and vulnerability to the threat, coupled with one’s
assessment of the rewards (i.e. maladaptive rewards)
that may arise from not taking protective actions.
This means that even if a threat is perceived as likely
and its impact severe, if the rewards for not taking an
action are high enough this will negate the protective
action.
Once an individual evaluates the threat, the
coping appraisal follows. This consists of an
assessment of response efficacy, self-efficacy and
response costs. Response efficacy refers to the
perceived effectiveness of reducing the threat, whilst
self-efficacy refers to an individual’s confidence in
carrying out the responding protective action against
the threat [2, 4]. The response costs are the costs
incurred when performing the protective behavior,
such as time, money, and overheads [4, 6, 14].
Overall, in the coping appraisal, the response efficacy
and self-efficacy must be greater than the response
costs for a protective action to be taken [7].

3.2 Hypothesis Development
The PMT states that if an individual assesses the
perceived severity of a threat to be high, they are
more likely to take protective actions to mitigate the
threat [7]. In a study with psychology students high
and low levels of threat severity were manipulated by
displaying an unexpected virus warning message
while participants browsed a website [14]. The
findings showed that participants who were exposed
to the high levels of severity were more likely to
install anti malware. Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan
[15] and Yoon et al. [11] also studied the protective
computing behaviors amongst university students and
found that severity positively impacted intention to
take protective actions. Turning to home computer
use, Jansen and van Schaik [6] and Woon et al. [19]
both found a positive and significant relationship
between severity and protective computing
behaviors. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: Perceived severity is positively related to
intention to implement additional security
measures.
When an individual perceives they are vulnerable
to security incidents, he/she is more likely to adopt
computer security measures (e.g. installing protective
software) to mitigate the risk. Vulnerability has
commonly been found to influence the intention to
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comply with security policies in an organizational
context [9, 14]. However, these findings have been
less consistent in relation to home computer security.
While Jansen and van Schaik [6] and Woon et al.
[19] found insignificant relationships between
vulnerability and intention, in contrast, Thompson et
al. [13] found that home computer users (individuals)
who believed they were vulnerable to general
security threats were more likely to engage in generic
protective computing behaviors. Given that most
studies suggest that vulnerability has a significant
effect on intention, we propose that:
H2: Perceived vulnerability is positively related to
implement additional security measures.

If individuals believe they are able to carry out a
protective behavior effectively, they are more likely
to perform the behavior [7]. The relationship between
self-efficacy and intention is supported in many
studies of protective behaviors including the work
setting [5, 9, 10, 14], and home computing setting [2,
6, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. A recent study of home
users found self-efficacy was important in
determining personal computing security intentions
[13]. This finding was also supported by Menard et
al. [17] who also studied security intentions in a
home context. Hence it is expected that:
H5: Self-efficacy is positively related to intention
to implement additional security measures.

Although Rogers [7] recognized the concept of
perceived rewards arising from not performing a
behavior, many IS security studies have excluded
maladaptive rewards [10, 13, 17]. As such, little is
known as to whether maladaptive rewards from not
performing a protective behavior impact protection
motivation [15]. Those that have examined
maladaptive rewards return mixed findings. For
example, while Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan [15]
did not find a significant relationship between
maladaptive rewards and intention to perform a
security behavior, consistent with the PMT, others
studies have found an inverse relationship between
maladaptive rewards and intention within the IS
security setting [5, 14]. For example, Boss et al. [14]
found that maladaptive rewards inversely affected
intention to comply to online security policies.
Hence, we propose:
H3: Maladaptive rewards are inversely related to
intention to implement additional security
measures.

The PMT suggests that if an individual perceives
the costs of implementing a protective behavior to be
high, then it is unlikely that the preventative behavior
will be adopted [7]. Response costs have been
identified as a context and individual dependent
construct [9]. As such, the impact of response costs
may vary across contexts. For example, some studies
have not found response costs to be significant in the
organizational context [9; 17]; this may be so because
factors such as time and money may not carry a
personal cost to the individual. By contrast, in the
home context, users are personally responsible for
any costs and overheads involved in taking protective
action. For example, a study of home users found that
users would intend to take precautionary measures to
secure their home wireless networks if response costs
were reduced [19]. Similarly, Thompson et al. [13]
found that response costs were significant in
determining whether to perform personal computing
security behaviors. Hence, we propose:
H6: Response costs are inversely related to
implement additional security measures.

The PMT suggests that if an individual believes a
protective action will mitigate a threat, they are more
likely to take action [7]. The relationship between
response efficacy and intention has been consistently
established in the general IS security literature [6, 9,
14, 17, 19, 20]. Response efficacy is also commonly
the strongest variable that predicts the intention to
perform a protective behavior [9]. For example,
Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan [15] found that
response efficacy directly affected intention to
implement anti malware on personal computing
devices. Yoon et al. [11] also found that response
efficacy affected intention to implement general IS
security measures on personal computers. Hence:
H4: Response efficacy is positively related to
intention to implement additional security
measures.

Subjective norms derive from the Theory of
Reasoned Action (TRA) [8]. This construct explains
how social pressures on an individual can cause a
behavioral response to an event [8]. Although not
originally included in the PMT [13], this construct is
commonly cited in PMT literature as explaining an
individual’s intention behind taking certain security
actions [10, 11]. In IS security, Ifinedo [9] found that
the compliance of other employees in organizations
influenced others to comply also with IS security
policies. Similarly, Tsai et al. [20] examined the
online security behaviors of general MTurk users and
found that the social circle of these users positively
influenced their computer security behaviors.
Likewise, we expect that the social circles of the
participants will impacts intention to take additional
security steps [8]. Hence we propose that:
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H7: Subjective norms are positively related to
implement additional security measures.
Figure 1 summarizes the above hypotheses.

Table 1. Sample Items
Construct

Sample Item

Perceived
Severity

If my home computer/laptop was affected
by a security breach it would cause major
problems

Perceived
Vulnerability

My home computer/laptop is vulnerable to
a security breach

Maladaptive
Rewards

Not taking additional security measures to
protect my home computer/laptop keeps me
from being confused

Response
Efficacy

Taking additional security measures will be
effective in protecting my home computer/
laptop

Self-Efficacy

I feel comfortable taking additional
measures to secure my home computer/
laptop

Response
Costs

There is too much work associated with
implementing additional security measures
on my home computer/laptop

Subjective
Norms

People whose opinions I value think that I
should take additional security measures to
protect my home computer/laptop

Intention
(Protection
Motivation)

I intend to take additional security measures
to protect my home computer/ laptop

Subjective Norms
Threat Appraisal
+H7

Perceived
Severity

Protection
Motivation
(Intention)

Perceived
Vulnerability
Maladaptive
Reward

Coping Appraisal
Response
Efficacy

Self-Efficacy

Response
Cost

Figure 1. Research model

4. Methodology
This study surveyed individuals in New Zealand
who owned a home computer or laptop. A link to the
online survey hosted by Qualtrics was sent out to
potential participants via organizational contacts and
poster advertising on a university campus.
All items in the survey were adapted from prior
research (See Table 1). Perceived severity (3 items),
vulnerability (3 items), response efficacy (3 items),
response costs (4 items), maladaptive rewards (5
items), and intention (6 items) were adapted from
Boss et al. [14]. Self-efficacy (5 items), subjective
norms (3 items) were adapted from Anderson and
Agarwal [2] and Thompson et al. [13]. All items were
measured using 7-point Likert scales anchored as
“Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.
This study used the Partial Least Squares
approach to structural equation modelling (PLSSEM) via Smart PLS 3.2.7 (with 500 resamples) to
evaluate the research model [22]. PLS-SEM is
suitable particularly for studies focused on prediction
where the aim is to explain the variance observed in
the dependent variable, as with this study which
focuses on understanding protection motivation (i.e.
operationalized as intention to implement additional
security measures) [23]. This approach is also
appropriate when there are many constructs included
in the research model with the model being relatively
complex compared to the sample size [23].

5. Results
Data were collected from 72 persons who
responded. Of the respondents, 50% were female.
Most were aged 18 to 34 years old (75%), and had an
undergraduate (39%) or postgraduate degree (49%).
The majority had owned their home devices for 5
years or more (81%); most persons owned a laptop
only (72%). Most (93%) had read or heard about
security breaches, and for 65% of the respondents
their computer had been affected by a security breach
(e.g. malware, virus).
The results of the tests of the measurement model
showed outer loadings ranged from 0.688 to 0.972.
Composite reliability ranged from 0.873 to 0.962,
and the average variance extracted (AVE) from 0.697
to 0.895 (Table 2). Being greater than recommended
cut-offs of 0.70, 0.70 and 0.50 respectively, these
satisfied the tests for adequate construct reliability
and convergence [23]. For discriminant validity, the
results (Table 2) also showed the square root of the
AVE values (shown on the diagonals) were greater
than the correlations among the constructs indicating
that the constructs were distinct from each other [23].
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Table 2. Composite Reliability, AVE, and
Discriminant Validity
CR

AVE

PS

PV

MR

RE

SE

RC

SN

PS

0.96 0.90

0.95

PV

0.89 0.73

0.35

0.85

MR

0.93 0.74

0.05

0.30

RE

0.87 0.70

0.37

0.12

0.02

0.84

SE

0.92 0.70

0.24

0.20

-0.03

0.69

0.84

RC

0.90 0.70

0.10

-0.08

0.50

0.17

-0.02

SN

0.95 0.87

0.06

-0.05

0.04

0.17

-0.07

0.16

0.93

Int

0.97 0.82

0.27

0.19

-0.25

0.64

0.60

-0.13

0.22

6. Discussion
Int

0.86

0.84

0.91

Key: Perceived Severity (PS); Perceived Vulnerability (PV); Response Efficacy
(RE); Self-Efficacy (SE); Maladaptive Rewards (MR); Response Cost (RC);
Subjective Norm (SN); Intention (Protection Motivation (INT)
Note: The square root of the AVE for each construct is shown on the
diagonals, and the correlations among the constructs on the off-diagonals.

For the structural model, attention is paid to the
R2 values (i.e. coefficient of determination) and path
coefficients [23]. The R2 value signals the goodness
of fit of the model; the higher the R2 value, the
greater the fit, and the better the model will represent
the data collected [24]. The results (Figure 2) showed
an R-square value of 0.582 suggesting the model
explained a moderate to substantial proportion of the
variance observed for protection motivation [23].
Subjective Norms
Threat Appraisal

0.210*

Perceived
Severity

Protection
Motivation
(Intention)

Perceived
Vulnerability

R2 = 0.582

Maladaptive
Reward

Coping Appraisal
Response
Efficacy

Self-Efficacy

Response
Cost

Key: *** P≤0.001; ** p≤0.01; * P≤0.05; ns = Not Supported

Figure 2. The Results

For threat appraisal, the results (Figure 2) showed
that maladaptive rewards (-0.262, p≤0.025) was
strongly related to intention; H3 was supported,
However perceived vulnerability (0.163, p=0.124)
and perceived severity (0.000) were not significant in
relation to intention; H1 and H2 were not supported.
Turning to the coping appraisal, response efficacy
(0.390, p≤0.003) and self-efficacy (0.304, p≤0.015)
were both significant predictors of intention, whilst
response cost (-0.078) was not. H4 and H5 were
supported, but not H6. Subjective norms was also
significant (0.210, p≤0.014), supporting H7.

As more individuals are using their home
computers and laptops for both work and personal
use, a large amount of sensitive information is
constantly being stored and exchanged on their
devices [1]. Due to the increase in the potential for
security breaches to occur with personal devices, it is
important that people take steps to secure their
devices beyond the base level of security that comes
with each device. Indeed many breaches occur
because of simple oversights on the users’ part (e.g.
using weak passwords, using the same passwords
across multiple devices or applications, downloading
applications from unknown sources, etc.) As such,
the aim of our study was to determine what motivates
persons to implement additional security measures on
their home computers and laptops.
Contrary to prior studies [9, 13, 14, 16], the
results showed that neither perceived vulnerability
nor perceived severity were significant in relation to
intention to implement additional security measures
on home computers and laptops. The insignificant
relationships for perceived severity and perceived
vulnerability in relation to intention were not only
inconsistent with the PMT, but also contrary to
studies of security behaviors both in the workplace
[5, 14], and at home [6, 13, 15, 11, 19]. An
explanation for this inconsistency may be due to the
threat appeal not being manipulated unlike Boss et al.
[14] who found that a higher threat appeal led to a
protective response, while a low threat appeal had
less impact on intention.
The significant relationship between maladaptive
rewards and intention is consistent with the findings
of Boss et al. [14] and Vance et al. [5], suggesting
that higher rewards would reduce intention to take
extra steps to secure one’s devices. Coupled with the
non-significance of the perceived severity and
perceived vulnerability, this finding is concerning as
maladaptive rewards can further lower the level of
the threat appraisal, such that persons do not feel it is
necessary to take additional measures to protect their
devices even if they believe these would protect their
devices from potential harm (response efficacy) and
they are capable of taking these steps (self-efficacy).
For the coping appraisal, the results identified
response efficacy and self-efficacy as moderate
predictors of intention to implement additional
security measures on home computers. This is
consistent with prior studies of home users [2, 6, 11,
15, 17, 19] and in the work place [9, 14]. Contrary to
expectations [13], response costs did not have a
significant impact on the protection motivation.
However, this is consistent with some studies that
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have likewise found an insignificant relationship in
organizations [9] and in home settings Menard et al.
[17].
Altogether the results have implications for
practice, in particular those who are responsible for
promoting internet safety and cybersecurity among
the public. The results show that what others think
(i.e. subjective norms) coupled with coping appraisal
(i.e. response efficacy and self-efficacy) are strong
motivators for people to take protective actions. On
the other hand, a low threat appraisal whether valid o
not, will lessen the motivation to take protective
actions. In addition, if the ‘reward’ of not taking
protective actions (e.g. saving time, preventing
confusion) is high enough this will further lessen the
motivation to take protective actions. To motivate
action, it is important to overcome the appeal of
‘maladaptive rewards’ by educating home computer
users of their vulnerability to and potential severity of
a security breach; high fear-appeal messages may
serve to heighten the threat appraisal and motivate
people to action [14].
It is further recommended that home users are
provided with checklists and ‘how-to’ guides on
additional security measures they should take to
minimize risk; these can range from simple
precautions (e.g. using strong passwords) to more
sophisticated measures such as adjusting the default
settings on their browser. Even if people are not
confident to take very involved steps (or the costs are
perceived as too high), the simple steps would go a
long way to improve the security of home devices.
Consistent with prior research [9, 20], the results
also highlighted the importance of social circles (e.g.
family, friends) which can have a strong impact on
protection motivation. Promoting the benefits and
uptake of computer security measures through public
education and awareness (See www.netsafe.org.nz),
may further motivate people to adopt these measures.

descriptive norms that may also impact behavior [2,
14]. The current sample of 72 responses though
small, was enough to assess the model [23]. Given
the number of weak or insignificant relationships
(e.g. perceived vulnerability, perceived severity,
response cost) it is expected that a greater number of
responses may make smaller significances detectable,
and shed more light on the predictors of intention.

7. Conclusion
This research focused on the implementation of
additional security measures on home computers and
laptops. While most studies have focused on
organizational settings or the general perceptions of
home users about security measures as a whole, this
study recognizes that newer computers and software
include a base level of security (e.g. Microsoft
Essentials), that require little or no user action.
However, this is not enough, and there are many
steps, ranging from simple to more complex
measures, that people can take to improve the
security of their home device. This study therefore
focused on the additional measures that people can
take to secure their devices to identify what would
encourage people to take these extra steps. By
distinguishing these additional measures (e.g. not
sharing passwords), this study contributes to the
literature and to practice by understanding better,
peoples’ motivations to go beyond the basics to
ensure the safety of their personal computing devices.
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